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ABSTRACT
The present study analyzes the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of privatized companies 
in the Jordanian market. Internal and external corporate governance are mechanisms believed to lead to the success 
of the privatization program. Internal factors, including ownership structure (ownership concentration and type, board 
members and size) and external factors (audit quality), seemingly affect performance. Different from extant research, 
the present study analyzes the unique Jordanian market, where close supervision of the privatization program by the 
royal family is common. An agency perspective, coupled with political intervention, serves as the background for the 
present study. Privatization methods (for example, strategic partnership versus direct sale) chosen by the said authority 
are believed to affect the performance of privatized companies. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) and multivariate 
econometric methodology are used to examine a pool of data from listed companies in the Amman Stock Exchange from 
1992 until 2001. The present study finds that the government’s refusal to relinquish control has resulted in the lack of 
success of the privatization program in Jordan. In contrast, factors demonstrating positive effects on the performance 
of privatized companies include private ownership concentration; foreign non-Arab ownership; small board size; and 
audit quality. The strategic partner chosen by the royal family and reduced government intervention positively affects 
the performance of companies. 
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INTRODUCTION
The participation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 
economy has encountered criticism despite their important 
role in the past. One of the criticisms is on the performance 
of these companies due to the lack of a corporate 
governance (CG) mechanism, that is, a majority of these 
corporations have substantial government ownership 
(Wu 2007). Property rights theory suggests that private 
companies perform more efficiently and profitably than 
SOEs (Boardman & Vining 1989) due to the need for SOEs 
to fulfill the profit maximization objective (shareholder 
theory) and the social welfare objective (stakeholder 
theory) (Nwanji & Howell 2007). In contrast, private 
enterprises focus more on the efficient intra-firm allocation 
of resources to maximize profit (Boubakri et al. 2005a). 
 Private investors provide managers with a stronger 
incentive to achieve better performance, unlike in SOEs 
(Debande & Friebel 2004) where the position and 
reputation of managers are at stake. Thus, SOEs are 
privatized in many countries. Megginson and Netter (2001) 
define “privatization” as the sale of SOE assets to private 
investors resulting in the transfer of majority ownership 
to the latter. 
 Many studies exist concerning privatization. The study 
by D’souza et al. (2005) on developed countries and that of 
Boubakri et al. (2005a) on developing countries document 
a significant increase in the performance of privatized 
companies. Nevertheless, the extent to which performance 
is increased in privatized companies may differ. In short, 
the effectiveness of privatization may differ between 
developed and developing countries.
 Privatization has become a subject of agency theory. 
An important objective of privatization is to ensure 
managers (agents) work on behalf of the principals, 
namely the shareholders in private companies (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Privatization is a distinct event that often 
leads to drastic changes in internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms (Boubakri et al. 2005a; Boubakri 
et al. 2005b). Consequently, the changes in corporate 
governance may affect the performance of privatized 
companies due to improved monitoring and/or less agency 
conflict (Che Haat et al. 2008). In addition, Gul et al. 
(2010), find foreign ownership (which may exist after 
privatization) and auditor quality are associated with less 
information asymmetry, thereby mitigating the agency 
problem. Improved corporate governance mechanisms 
also assure corporate investors receive adequate returns on 
their investments (Shleifer &Vishny 1997). In the Jordan-
specific context, Awamleh (2002) suggests that changes in 
corporate governance lead to the success of privatization 
programs. Such finding is consistent with Gentzoglanis 
(2007) who argues that privatization needs effective 
corporate governance and policies to ensure sufficient 
protection for shareholders and foreign investors in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including Jordan. 
Therefore, determining whether these changes have an 
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effect on the performance of privatized Jordanian SOEs is 
beneficial.
 Privatization became an issue in Jordan when Prime 
Minister Awn Khasawneh made a promise to the parliament 
to comprehensively review the privatization processes and 
to consider ‘reacquiring’ some assets in December 2011 
(Kayyali 2012). The promise was made following tens of 
suspected cases of unethical business behavior, including 
mismanagement and corruption, being sent to the Anti-
Corruption Committee (ACC). The author also highlights 
that inefficient business deals were made and a huge 
burden of debts exists among the privatized companies. 
One of the most important examples of the privatization 
problem in Jordan involves corruption cases such as in 
Khaled Shaheen. This company is a privatized company 
by the name Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company (JPRC). 
The four persons involved are Khaled Shaheen; a former 
JPRC director-general, Ahmad Rifai; the prime minister’s 
economic adviser, Mohammad Rawashdeh and Adel 
Qudah, a former finance minister and former chairman 
of JPRC. The case circumstance is selection of a strategic 
partner for an expansion project at the JPRC that was worth 
$2.1 billion. The last three names were acquitted with 
the charge of public office misuse (Maayeh 2010). It is 
believed that the root of the problem is in the privatization 
process, in which the government did not give up control 
over privatized companies (Kayyali 2012).
 The aforementioned problems are believed to have 
originated from the background of the entities involved 
in the processes and methods of privatization. Jordan is 
a special case due to its monarchy system. In Jordan, 
the opposition claims that the royal families, who are 
politicians, negatively affect the country’s economy (Habib 
2011). The politicians may also use the proceeds from 
privatization of state entities (Habib 2011). In contrast, 
there is also an argument that the king contributes to 
the country positively through his global connections. It 
can be expected that the king could contribute positively 
in the privatization program through the privatization 
methods chosen by the Jordanian state authority (Economic 
Planning Unit 2006). The question, therefore, is as follows: 
Do privatization methods affect corporate governance 
structure and company performance?
 The present study contributes to literature in the 
field by investigating the role of royal families in 
the privatization process. The privatization methods 
determined by the process within the political process 
are predicted to influence the performance of privatized 
companies. The investigation in the present study 
challenges the existing beliefs concerning the factors 
that determine the success of privatization, particularly 
in developing countries. An agency perspective, coupled 
with some political intervention, serves as the background 
of this study. The involvement of royal families in politics 
and business is common in the Middle East and some other 
Asian countries. Results from the present study could 
shed some light on the effectiveness of royal intervention 
in privatization processes. Privatization methods, such as 
strategic partnership and direct sale methods, may expose 
changes in ownership structure. Therefore, in the context 
of privatization, control over the privatization process by 
the royal family in Jordan leads to the determination of 
ownership structure. Thus, unlike prior studies, the present 
study investigates the effect of these methods and other 
governance mechanisms on the performance of privatized 
companies. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) argue that, in equilibrium, ownership structure is 
endogenously determined by a set of firm-level variables in 
the contracting environment, trading off costs and benefits 
of ownership concentration. Therefore, with respect to 
the endogeneity problem of ownership, the present study 
includes firm-level variables as explanatory variables 
for ownership concentration; and considers privatization 
timing and methods that influence the privatization process. 
The remainder of the present paper is divided into five 
sections. After the introduction, Section 2 presents 
background information on privatization in Jordan, upon 
which the hypotheses development is based. In Section 
3, the sample selection; the data collection process; and 
the empirical model are discussed. Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings and discussions. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the study.
STUDY BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
SOEs, as companies controlled by the government, have 
multiple objectives, including profitability, efficiency, 
and the social welfare of citizens. However, privatized 
companies usually focus on profit maximization (D’souza 
et al. 2001), although the current trend is toward 
economically, environmentally and socially sustainable 
orientations. Sheshinski and López-Calva (2003) argue 
that the incentive problem caused by state ownership 
affects the way managers pursue these objectives. Thus, the 
difference in the objectives of SOEs and private companies 
could significantly affect the financial performance of these 
companies. In fact, efforts in achieving these multiple 
objectives could become a good excuse for SOEs to fail 
to achieve their expected financial performance. The 
appointment of new managers in the companies could 
improve the SOEs performance (Barberis et al. 1996; 
Warzynski 2003). 
 Privatization proceedings are unique in Jordan due 
to the involvement of the royal family. Such involvement 
affects the process and results of privatization. Jordan is 
a constitutional monarchy with the royal family at the 
top of the power pyramid. There is evidence of physical 
representative of the royal families in the government. 
In Jordan, the King appoints the Prime Minister and has, 
to some extent, the power to control the government 
formation. Although there are elected leaders, the Prime 
Minister can only appoint ministers that forms the cabinet 
upon approval by the King. 
 To make sure that privatization program achieves 
its objectives, the Jordanian government created an 
institutional framework to control the process of 
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privatization. The framework has three mechanisms: the 
higher ministerial privatization committee; the executive 
privatization commission; and the supporting committees 
and task forces. The three mechanisms are responsible for 
initiating and implementing the privatization program. 
 The higher ministerial privatization committee (here 
in after Privatization Council) consists of experts that can 
draft privatization policies and includes the Prime Minister; 
the Deputy Prime Minister; the Minister of Finance; the 
Minister of Industry and Trade; the Minister of Planning; 
the Minister of Justice; the Governor of the Central Bank; 
and four other specialized experts. The Chairman appoints 
one of the Council members as the Vice-Chairman. 
 According to privatization law, the Privatization 
Council has several responsibilities and powers 
(Privatization Law 2000; Economic Planning Unit 1998), 
including drafting of general privatization policies to 
achieve its objectives and to ensure its success. The 
Privatization Council also has the power to decide 
which public entity is to be privatized; and the method 
of privatization (i.e., whether to use direct sales, transfer 
of rights, or through strategic partnerships). Furthermore, 
the Privatization Council may engage other parties, 
such as consulting firms and legal advisors, during 
such processes. Thus, the members of the Privatization 
Council, in general, lack independence as they are also 
a part of the ministry. 
 On the other hand, it is expected that the process 
of selecting the qualified consulting firms to carry out 
preliminary studies on the viability of proposed project 
and the recommendation of strategic partners to the Prime 
Minister’s council and the king could affect the results 
of privatization. In particular, it can be expected that 
continuous supervision by strategic partners, as opposed 
to direct sales, could have a positive effect on company 
performance. Thus, the king’s involvement in the process 
of approving privatization plans involving strategic 
partnerships is predicted to have a positive effect on post 
privatization company performance. For example, in 2000, 
forty percent of Jordan Telecommunication Company 
(JTC) was sold to a consortium of investors on the basis 
of strategic partnership (an international company with 
vast experience in telecommunication industry). It was 
expected that the strategic partnership will be capable of 
improving the performance and strategic value of JTC. 
In this arrangement, a complete management contract 
was signed specifying that the management of JTC will 
technically be the responsibility of the strategic partner. The 
strategic partner was expected to bring foreign investment 
into the country (in this case, France Telecom Group had 
acquired shares in the company and became the majority 
shareholder). The strategic partner was also expected to 
bring new technology; financial and management systems; 
and commercial orientation into the company.
 The second mechanism is the executive privatization 
commission. The executive privatization unit was 
established at the end of 1996 to facilitate the privatization 
process. The commission is responsible for ensuring 
that transactions are executed along with any other 
responsibilities assigned by the council. According to the 
Privatization Law (2000), this commission is financially 
and administratively independent. However, it is noted that 
the commission is at the same time affiliated with the prime 
minister’s office and the chairman of this commission is 
appointed by the prime minister. Additionally, the prime 
minister has the power to determine the salary and bonuses, 
as well as to terminate the chairman (Al-Kodah 2002). 
This unique characteristic of the Jordanian privatization 
program raises issues relating to the political agency 
theory. The commission has the power and responsibility 
to follow up the execution of all decisions made regarding 
the privatization (PL 2000). 
 The third mechanism consists of the supporting 
committees and task forces. First, a steering committee 
is formed for each project to control the privatization 
transaction (EPU 1998) and to facilitate communication and 
coordination with other parties. Such committees report to 
the higher privatization committee. With regards to the task 
forces, their main task is to form working committees for 
each project to implement the directives from the experts. 
Recommended actions are forwarded from one committee 
to another to ensure proper sharing of knowledge (EPU 
1998). Finally, a special tendering committee exists to 
approve government tenders relating to each privatization 
project. Thus, the commissions, task forces and committees 
are related (appointed and make reports) to the ministries, 
and ultimately the royal families, are supported by relevant 
law to ensure the success of privatization programs. 
 Privatization through strategic partnerships and direct 
sale methods are also predicted to attract more foreign 
investors, which could lead to improved performance 
among companies, as stated in the objectives of the 
Executive Privatization Commission (EPC 1997). According 
to Cook and Kirkpatrick (1995), company performance 
should ideally be assessed in terms of the objectives for 
privatization. Article (3) of the Privatization Law in Jordan 
specifies the following objective: “Raising the efficiency, 
productivity, and competitiveness of economic enterprises” 
(Privatization Law 2000). Extant literature examines 
whether privatization achieves its objectives, primarily 
by looking at the outcome (i.e., performance) (D’souza et 
al. 2001; D’souza & Megginson 1999; La Porta &Lopez-
De-Silane 1999; Megginson et al. 1994). However, studies 
that examine the effect of the privatization process on the 
performance of privatized companies remain lacking. This 
issue is important in Jordan, and possibly in other countries 
with similar a background, because the royal family has 
substantial involvement in both privatization processes 
and business.
 Against this background, it is interesting to see how 
the effect of the royal families through privatization process 
(political economy perspective) and other corporate 
governance (CG) mechanisms on the performance of 
privatized companies. CG involves mechanisms (structure 
and process) that allow shareholders to obtain their required 
rate of return on their investment and achieve better 
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performance. Boubakri et al. (2004) study the role of CG in 
increasing the efficiency of company management. From 
this perspective, private companies have an advantage 
because they are more likely to produce high-quality 
financial reporting by appointing a Big Four auditor 
(Guedhami et al. 2009). Private companies also have the 
flexibility to determine the size of the board, which plays 
an important role in monitoring managers (Jensen 1993; 
Lipton & Lorsch 1992). Therefore, these mechanisms 
(audit quality and board size) and their effects on the 
performance of privatized companies are also investigated. 
Another important issue argued by corporate governance 
literature is the endogenous nature of ownership (Boubakri 
et al. 2005b; Drakos & Bekiris 2010; Elsayed 2011; 
Getzmann et al. 2010; Grosfeld 2006a 2006b; Grosfeld & 
Hashi 2003; Gul et al. 2010; Hanousek et al. 2007; Omran 
et al. 2008; Shakir 2011; Wei et al. 2005). Endogeneity is 
caused by unobserved heterogeneity, which could lead 
to misspecification of the models. In the privatization 
context, some variables that determine ownership 
concentration can also affect firm performance (Boubakri 
et al. 2005b; Boubakri et al. 2011; Grosfeld 2006a 2006b; 
Omran 2009; Omran et al. 2008). The result is a spurious 
relationship between ownership concentration and 
company performance. 
 The problem of endogeneity could also occur in the 
present study. Privatization methods have the potential 
to affect the performance of companies (Al Qudah 2010; 
Dean & Andreyeva 2001; Astami et al. 2010; Boubakri et 
al. 2009; D’souza et al. 2007; Foreman-Peck & Waterson 
1985) and may also affect ownership concentration 
(Boubakri et al. 2005b; Grosfeld 2006a 2006b; Grosfeld 
& Hashi 2003; Megginson et al. 1994; Omran 2009). 
In this context, Guedhami (2003) states that using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach will 
cause misspecification due to unobserved heterogeneity. 
Boubakri et al. (2005b) and Hanousek et al. (2007) 
overcome this problem by using instrument variables (IVs) 
in a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) setting. The 
fitted value of the ownership concentration coefficient is 
used in the second stage of the system. Thus, unobservable 
heterogeneity needs careful investigation. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
According to Hanousek et al. (2007), private ownership 
concentration, relative to state ownership, tends to 
be associated with superior performance in the post 
privatization period. Consistent with this finding, in the 
context of MENA countries, a study by Ben Naceur et al. 
(2007) suggests that significant increases in profitability 
and operating efficiency occur when the government 
relinquishes control and when there is increases in 
foreign ownership. Retaining state ownership and 
control appears to be associated with inefficiency and 
value destruction in privatized companies (Boubakri et 
al. 2009; Zeitun 2009; Zeitun & Tian 2007). According 
to the Executive Privatization Commission of Jordan, 
the government has the tendency to retain control over 
privatized companies (PL 2000). It is evident that Jordanian 
government ownership has remained highly concentrated 
after privatization (Al-Akra et al. 2009; Al-Akra et al. 
2010b), which may negatively affect the success of the 
privatization project (Al-Kodah 1998). 
 In the context of agency theory, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that ownership 
concentration has a positive effect on the performance of 
companies. This effect is due to the fact that ownership 
concentration usually leads to the convergence of interests 
between shareholders and management. Many studies 
likewise support that ownership identity significantly 
affects the performance of privatized companies (Ben 
Naceur et al. 2007; Boubakri et al. 2004, 2005a). 
Thus,
H1 A positive relationship exists between private 
ownership concentration and the performance of 
privatized companies.
Type of Ownership Concentration It is also believed 
that changes in the types of ownership and private 
ownership concentration level contribute to the changes 
in performance. Claessens et al. (1997)demonstrate that 
ownership concentration by local investors and ownership 
by bank-sponsored investment privatization funds 
increase profitability and Tobin’s Q. D’souza et al. (2005, 
2007) find that foreign ownership contributes to stronger 
improvements in efficiency after privatization.
 Omran (2009) concludes that ownership concentration 
and ownership type, particularly in the case of foreign 
investors, have a positive impact on company performance. 
Another argument is that not all foreign investments 
positively affect the performance of privatized companies 
(Kang & Stulz 1997; Anderson et al. 2001; Wei et al. 
2002), possibly owing to familiarity with local markets. 
The present study makes a similar argument with respect 
to foreign investors. Foreign Arab investors have less 
experience and could negatively affect investments in 
Jordan (Naser & Al-Khatib 2000; Naser et al. 2002; 
Al-Akra et al. 2010a). The argument is consistent with 
the resource dependence perspective (when competency 
comes into the picture) within agency theory (regarding 
monitoring of the managers or agents). These types of 
foreign ownership may have different effects on the 
performance of privatized companies. 
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis:
H2 Ownership types affect the performance of privatized 
companies.
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The board of directors is an important CG mechanism for 
companies (Mcafee & McMillan 1987). In SOEs, political 
managers have social welfare-oriented objectives, such 
as increasing employment by expanding their operations 
(Sheshinski & López-Calva 2003), that could lead to 
poor performance. Morck et al. (1989) argue that when 
companies are performing poorly, changing the board 
of directors may improve company performance. In 
the context of privatization, Barberis et al. (1996) and 
Frydman et al. (1999) argue that changing the board 
of directors is an efficient mechanism to discipline 
incumbent managers. 
 In addition, Mak and Li (2001) argue that changing the 
board of directors makes the directors more accountable 
to the companies and affects company performance. This 
is supported by several studies in the privatization field 
(Megginson et al. 1994; Denis & Denis 1995; Barberis et 
al. 1996; Lopez-De-Silanes, 1997; Claessens & Djankov 
1999; Gibson 2003; Peng et al. 2003; Warzynski 2003; 
Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc 2007; Kang & Kim 2012). The 
strategy is also consistent with the studies of Awamleh 
(2002), Dawley and Haidar (2008) and Al-Fayoumi et 
al. (2010), which suggest that the application of good CG 
mechanisms can efficiently monitor managers in Jordan. 
Nevertheless, the effect of specific CG mechanisms on the 
performance of privatized SOEs in the Jordanian context 
requires further investigation. 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3 Changes in the composition of the board of directors 
positively affects the performance of privatized 
companies.
 Changes in the board of directors lead to the formation 
of larger or smaller boards. Two theories are related to 
board size: resource independence theory and agency 
theory. The resource independence theory argues that a 
large board is better than a small board (Zahra & Pearce 
1989), while agency theory argues otherwise (Jensen 1993; 
Lipton & Lorsch 1992). 
 Agency theory argues that having a large board has 
negative effects. Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) argue that a large board may impose higher costs, 
such as communication problems (Eisenberg et al. 1998); 
increased dissension among board members (Jensen 
1993); and free-riding problems (Eisenberg et al. 1998). 
Therefore, a large board size may increase agency problems 
(Ning et al. 2010), which could, in turn, negatively affect 
company performance. Empirical studies largely support 
the claim that large boards negatively affect company 
performance (Barnhart & Rosenstein 1998; Cheng 2008; 
Coles et al. 2008; De Andres et al. 2005; Di Pietra et al. 
2008; Eisenberg et al. 1998; Loderer & Peyer 2002; Mak 
& Kusnadi 2005; Postma et al. 2003; Yermack 1996). 
 Agency theory also argues that having a small board 
could positively affect company performance (Belkhir 
2009; Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Larmou & Vafeas 2010; 
Mak & Li 2001;Vafeas 2000). In the context of diversified 
board members that consists of representatives from state, 
types of foreign investors and the level of concentration, 
it is expected the coordination and communication effects 
would dominate. Hence, larger board could results in more 
coordination and communication problems in the board 
and lead to ineffective board monitoring. 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H4 Board size negatively affects the performance of 
privatized companies.
EXTERNAL AUDIT
Audit is an important tool for CG that enhances the 
credibility and transparency of financial reporting (Francis 
et al. 2003). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue 
that the credibility of financial reporting makes managers 
more accountable to shareholders; causes less risk taking 
by managers; and mitigates their improper behavior. Mitton 
(2002) argues that a good audit constitutes one aspect of 
CG that reduces the agency problem. In the context of 
privatization, Boycko et al. (1996) argue that a quality audit 
of firms provide shareholders with detailed information 
about managers that lead to better allocation of resources 
(Francis et al. 2003). 
 DeAngelo (1981) and Francis and Wilson (1988) 
argue that audit quality can be represented by auditor size 
(the independence of the accounting firms) and brand 
name (as more wealth is at stake in large audit firms). In 
addition, extant research points to an opposite relationship 
between audit quality and the size of audit firms (Chaney 
et al. 2000; Francis & Simon 1987). In this respect, Francis 
(2004) argues that the Big Four audit firms could become a 
proxy for audit quality. These audit firms promote greater 
transparency and acceptable levels of audit quality through 
their systems. In this respect, large audit firms are more 
concerned with minimizing audit errors (DeAngelo 1981) 
and are inclined to provide higher quality disclosure (Dye 
1993). In addition, large audit firms allay investor fears and 
benefit minority shareholders by increasing transparency 
(Francis 2004) due to the highly cautious approach taken 
by these firms in preserving their reputation and prominent 
name. Evidence supports the contention that large audit 
firms may risk greater losses through reputation damage 
if their audit services do not meet expected standards 
(DeFond et al. 2000; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Che 
Haat et al. 2008).
 Large audit firms spend more hours and have higher 
billing rates, which result in better expertise and a higher 
quality audit (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis & Krishnan 
1999; Francis & Wilson 1988). Big Four audit firms 
possess less threshold for issuing modified audit reports 
and greater reporting conservatism (Francis & Krishnan 
1999). DeAngelo (1981) and Dye (1993) support the 
theoretical claim that large audit firms have more incentives 
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to issue accurate reports than small audit firms. Francis 
and Krishnan (1999), Lennox (1999), and Weber and 
Willenborg (2003) agree that Big Four audit firms issue 
more accurate reports and more informative signals 
of financial distress than small firms. In the context of 
privatization, audit quality leads investors to trust company 
information (Marianne 2009), subsequently increasing the 
share price (Gul et al. 2010). Hence, developing countries 
with weak CG can utilize audit quality as a substitute 
mechanism for CG to ensure investor protection (Lin & 
Liu 2010; Marianne 2009). This argument is supported 
by several studies demonstrating that the appointment of 
Big Four audit firms by privatized companies improves 
the CG of these companies (Guedhami et al. 2009; Lin & 
Liu 2009, 2010; Wang et al. 2008). 
 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H5 Audit quality positively affects the performance of 
privatized companies.
DATA SET AND EMPIRICAL MODELS
DATA SET
The privatization program was first launched in Jordan in 
1996, at which point the government proposed privatizing 
64 companies (Amman Stock Exchange 2010; Economic 
Planning Unit 2006). The data set in the present study is 
obtained from several sources, including the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE); the Executive Privatization Commission 
in Jordan; and the annual reports of the companies.
 In the present paper, SOEs are considered to be 
companies previously owned (with more than 40% 
ownership) by the government through shareholding, 
but that were eventually privatized. The minimum 
observation for each company is eight years, covering 
three years prior to (t=-3) privatization and three years 
after (t=+3) privatization (La Porta & Lopez-De-Silane 
1999; Megginson et al. 1994). The present study uses an 
annual data set covering the period of 1992 until 2001. 
Although the government passed the CG law of practices 
in 2002, compliance by companies is not compulsory. In 
addition, information on CG mechanisms is not available 
in the annual reports after 2001 (Al-Akra et al. 2010a; Al-
Akra et al. 2009), thereby limiting the data set. This fact 
was confirmed by the capital market authority in Jordan. 
Since the present study focuses on a special event that 
occurred in the 1990s and in the early millennium, it is 
believed to be sufficient to draw conclusions from this 
dataset. However, the conclusion may not be applicable 
for privatization processes that were organized later. Table 
1 below shows the data set for the two groups under study.
 Table 1 presents the distribution of data according 
to industry affiliation and years. The sample consists of 
18 privatized companies, where transfers of ownership 
were accomplished either through direct sale to private 
investors or technical strategic partnerships. Thus, the 
present study sample consists of 18 privatized companies 
and covers a 10-year period, resulting in 180 observations. 
However, the final data analyses are still unbalanced due 
to missing data.
EMPIRICAL MODELS
Applying standard OLS regression may lead to a 
misspecification problem in which unobserved determinants 
of company performance may also explain ownership 
concentration factor. This issue is also known as the 
endogeneity problem. Thus, to deal with this problem, the 
2SLS method is utilized. In the first stage of the method, 
an OLS regression of the determinant variables (a set 
of unobservable heterogeneity variables obtained from 
previous literature) that affect ownership concentration 
is performed (Boubakri et al. 2005b; Drakos & Bekiris 
2010; Elsayed 2011; Getzmann et al. 2010; Grosfeld 
2006a, 2006b; Grosfeld & Hashi 2003; Gul et al. 2010; 
Hanousek et al. 2007; Omran et al. 2008; Shakir 2011; 
Wei et al. 2005). 
 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the type of 
industry may lead to a different concentration of ownership. 
As such, because the Jordanian government focuses on 
privatizing service or manufacturing companies, different 
effects on the concentration of private ownership may 
have ensued. In addition, the said authors argue that 
diversification risk, or having a small percentage of shares 
in large firms by investors, negatively affects ownership 
concentration (Boubakri et al. 2005b; Omran 2009). To 
control for the unobservable heterogeneity, Bortolottia et 
al. (2002), Megginson et al. (2004) and Boubakri et al. 
(2005b) argue that different methods of privatization could 
affect the sale of privatized company shares over the years. 
Therefore, in the Jordanian case, strategic partnerships 
and direct sales are the more common methods used by 
the government to gradually sell shares of companies that 
TABLE 1. Sample Distribution
Sample Time
(1992–2001)
Privatized 
Years
Number Industry 
affiliation
Number
Privatized Sample 10 years 1996 3 Services 9
 1997
1998
5
10
Manufacturing 9
Total sub sample 18 18
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could affect the level of private ownership concentration 
over the years. Thus, the present study must control for the 
effect of these unobservable variables on the concentration 
of ownership by setting the following equations, where i is 
a company at time t, γt  is fixed year effect (to control for 
year-specific effects), and εt is the error term. 
 CONCit = α +β1SIZEit + β2INFit+ β3METHit+ β4YEARit
   + β5MEDit +γt + εit.
 (1)
 CONCit = α +β1SIZEit + β2INFit+ β3YEARit + β4MEDit 
   + β5(MAJit X METHit) +γt + εit.
  (2)
 Where INF is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if a 
service company and 0 if otherwise (Demsetz & Lehn 
1985; Boubakri et al. 2005); SIZE is company size that is 
the natural logarithm of the total assets (Demsetz & Lehn 
1985; Himmelberg et al. 1999); METH is privatization 
method measured by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if a 
strategic partnership and 0 if a direct sale method is used 
(Bortolottia et al. 2002; Boubakri et al. 2005b; Grosfeld 
2006a 2006b; Megginson et al. 2004; Omran 2009); 
YEAR is post-privatization year represented by a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 after or at privatization year and 0 if 
before privatization year (Boubakri et al. 2005b; Omran 
2009); MED is the initial post privatization year measured 
by a dummy variable, equal to one after or at privatization 
median year and zero before the privatization median year 
(Andreyeva & James 2000); and MAJ is government control 
measured by a dummy variable, equal to one if government 
ownership is equal or less than 50% and zero if more than 
50% of total ownership (Omran 2009). These variables are 
summarized in the following table:
 In the second stage, the fitted estimated values 
obtained from the first stage, (i.e., Model 1) are used in 
next models as , where the term γt is a firm dummy 
introduced for company-specific effect; and ε1t and ε2t are 
the error terms. In addition, several dummy variables of 
board size are examined to identify the point of statistical 
significance of the effect of board size on performance in 
order to test H4. 
 PERFit = α1 + β1 it + β2AUQit + β3BOCHit + β4BOZit 
  + (β5BOZit x Dn,it) + γt +εit.
 (3)
where Dn
 
 
The same models are used to obtain fitted values for 
each type of ownership concentration CONCit with respect 
to the unobservable heterogeneity of model (1), where 
CONCit is the sum of shares held by the three largest owners 
according to type; and j refers to the foreign ownership of 
non-Arab, foreign Arab, and government ownership of the 
companies i at time t. 
 PERFit = α1 + θijtCONCijt + β2AUQit + β3BOCHit 
  + β4BOZit + (β5BOZit x Dn,it) + γt +εit. 
 (4)
 Where is the coefficient of fitted value of the 
first stage (Boubakri et al. 2005b; Omran 2009; Omran 
et al. 2008); AUQ is audit quality measured bya dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if the audit firms are Big Four firms 
and 0 if otherwise (Francis 2004); BOCH is board change 
measured by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if there is a 
change in the board members and 0 if otherwise (Cragg 
& Dyck 1999); BOZ is board size – (.e., the number of 
TABLE 2. The Measurement of First Stage Variables
Variables Definition
Panel-A: Independent
INF A dummy variable equal to one if a service company and zero otherwise.
SIZE The natural logarithm of the total assets. 
METH A dummy variable equal to one if strategic partnership and zero direct sale. 
YEAR A dummy variable equal to one after or at privatization year and zero before the privatization year. 
MED A dummy variable equal to one after or at privatization median year and zero before privatization median year. 
MAJ A dummy variable equal to one if government ownership is equal or less than 50% and zero if more than 50% 
of total ownership. 
Panel-B: Dependent  
CONC Measured by the sum of the shares held by the largest three private shareholders.
Note: This table describes the variables used in the first stage of 2SLS regression to investigate the determinants of the private ownership concentration. 
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board members) (Shakir 2011); and PERF is company 
performance (Boubakri et al. 2004; Boubakri et al. 
2005b; Omran 2007; Omran et al. 2008) represented 
by return on equity (ROE), price earnings ratio (PER) 
or price-to-book-value ratio (PBV). Estimation of each 
measure of performance as dependent variable will be 
done separately. Thus, these variables summarized in 
Table 2:
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Several econometric issues are highlighted in the present 
study to obtain an efficient estimator of the model. The 
present model is developed by following the assumptions 
of the classical linear regression model (CLMR), which 
is seemingly unrelated regression in the pooled data set. 
These assumptions include the intercept term, E(ut)=0; 
homoscedasticity, var(ut) = σ2<∞; no auto-correlation 
cov, (ui, uj) = 0; non-stochastic of independent variables 
cov, (ui, xt) = 0; and disturbances that are normally 
distributed, ut~ N (0, σ2) (Asteriou & Hall 2007; Baltagi 
2005; Brooks 2008; Gujarati & Porter 2009). In addition, 
the instrument variables (IVs) must satisfy two conditions. 
First, the IVs must be highly correlated to the ownership 
concentration (Gujarati 2003). Second, the IVs must also 
satisfy the condition of E [ε1itZit]=0, where Zit is the CONC 
(Gujarati 2003).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Determinants of CONC   The results obtained from Models 
1 and 2 are reported in Table 4. The results generally 
confirm the expectations noted in the section dealing with 
Hypotheses Development. Estimation results precisely 
show that SIZE negatively affects CONC (significant at the 
1% level for both models). These findings are consistent 
with the results of previous studies, such as those by 
Boubakri et al. (2005b) and Omran (2009).
 Furthermore, the findings show that industry type 
(services or manufacturing) has a positive relationship 
with CONC at the 1% level for both models. This result 
implies that the government has the propensity to privatize 
service companies more than manufacturing companies, 
resulting in higher CONC. This result confirms the findings 
of Boubakri et al. (2005b) and Omran (2009) that the 
government is slightly reluctant to relinquish control over 
companies that play an important role in the country’s 
economy. However, the government may prefer to privatize 
service companies that cater to the social objectives and 
infrastructures of the country.
 The investigation of the effect of METH on the 
performance of companies is an important contribution 
of the present study. The value of METH is 1 if strategic 
partnership is used, whereas its value is 0 if direct selling 
is used for privatization. The results indicate a moderately 
positive and significant relationship at the 10% level 
between METH and CONC. The second model includes 
the variable MAJ to test whether the government sells the 
majority of its holdings over the companies and gives up 
control to private owners. The results indicate a significant 
and positive relationship between METH and CONC at the 
1% level. This finding suggests that a strategic partnership 
program is more likely to result in higher CONC. 
 The results also reveal that CONC is higher in post 
privatization YEAR. In addition, the period of MED is found 
to have a negative and significant relationship at the 10% 
level with CONC. This result suggests that the government 
does not give up control in MED. Control is only transferred 
when the companies show an improvement in performance.
Ownership concentration (CONC) and firm performance 
In this section, we examine the theoretical argument by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which states that CONC can 
be a substitute mechanism for other CG mechanisms in 
developing countries. The reason for this phenomenon is 
that ownership concentration can mitigate agency problems 
due to the convergence of ownership and control, which, 
in turn, results in superior company performance.
TABLE 3. The Measurement of Second Stage Variables
Variables Definition
Panel-A: Independent
CONC
AUQ
BOCH
BOZ
D1
D2
D3
The coefficient of fitted value of the first stage 
A dummy variable equal to one if the audit firms are four big firms and zero if otherwise.
A dummy variable equal to one if change in the board and zero if otherwise
Board size is equal to the number of board members 
A dummy variable equal to one if less than 9 and zero if otherwise
A dummy variable equal to one if less than 10 and zero if otherwise
A dummy variable equal to one if less than 11and zero if otherwise
Panel-B: Dependent (PERF)
ROE
PER
PBVR
Return on equity
Price earnings ratio
Price to book value ratio
Note: This table describes the variables used in the second stage of 2SLS regression to investigate the CG affect on performance of the companies.  
  39
 Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Palia (2001) suggest 
using IVs to address the endogeneity nature of ownership 
structure. This suggestion is supported by several other 
researchers who use 2SLS dynamic modeling to deal with 
the problem, such as Boubakri et al. (2005b), Grosfeld 
(2006a), Omran (2009) and Omran et al. (2008). In the 
first stage, the model estimates CONC to obtain the fitted 
value of the estimation and uses these values as IVs in 
the second stage. Thus, the process shows the impact of 
CONC on the performance of privatized companies. 
 Another argument is that one or more IVs used 
might directly affect the performance of the company 
(dependent variable), which leads to a strong relationship 
(Palia 2001). Others researchers argue that endogeneity 
problem arises from unobserved heterogeneity (Boubakri 
et al. 2005b; Grosfeld 2006a 2006b; Omranet al. 2008 
2009; and Boubakri et al. 2011). Examples of unobserved 
heterogeneity include privatization methods, which 
some researchers argue could affect the performance of 
privatized companies (Foreman-Peck & Waterson, 1985; 
Andreyeva & James 2000; D’souza et al. 2007; Boubakri 
et al. 2009; Al Qudah 2010; Astami et al. 2010). In 
contrast, other researchers argue that privatized methods 
could determine private ownership concentration 
(Boubakri et al. 2005; Grosfeld 2006a 2006b; Omran 
2009).
 Thus, the method employed checks for the possibility 
that endogeneity arises from unobserved heterogeneity 
i.e privatization method (METH), by regressing company 
performance on the (Zit) IVs. The results show that METH 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, as shown in 
Appendix A. This result suggests dropping METH from the 
first stage of regression because it has an impact on both 
CONC and the performance of companies. The results show 
that the adjusted R2 of 0.03 is very low compared with the 
0.107 obtained in the 2SLS system. This finding is similar to 
the findings of Boubakri et al. (2005b), Grosfeld (2006a), 
Omran (2009) and Omran et al. (2008). 
 This statistical result supports the argument that 
privatization methods chosen by the royal family may 
positively affect the performance of privatized firms. Thus, 
we decided that privatization methods should be in the first 
stage of (2SLS). 
 Furthermore, IVs must satisfy the requirement that the 
endogenous variable should be uncorrelated with the error 
term E [ε1itZit]. The Hausman test is conducted, following 
Boubakri et al. (2005b), to determine the endogeneity 
of CONC. The t-statistic result for the coefficient on the 
residuals from the first step regression is 2.06. The p-value 
of this test is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, 
the result rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between CONC and the error term e, which indicates that 
TABLE 4. Determinants of CONC
CONCit = α +β1SIZEit + β2INFit+ β3METHit+ β4YEARit + β5MEDit +γt + εit … (1)
CONCit = α +β1SIZEit + β2INFit+ β4YEARit + β5MEDit + β6(MAJit X METHit) +γt + εit … (2)
Dependent CONC
Independent  Model 1 Model 2
INF 7.581***
(2.952)
10.575***
(5.347)
MED -8.033*
(-1.705)
-8.415*
(-1.775)
YEAR 27.719***
(3.441)
26.147***
(3.279)
SIZE -2.973***
(-6.827)
-1.324***
(-1.986)
METH 5.306*
(1.873)
-11.080***
( -2.650)
MAJ  23.431***
(1.887)
N
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
178
0.087
2.201***
178
0.107
2.416***
Note: CONC is the private ownership concentration measured by the sum of the shareholdings of the three largest private 
shareholders; SIZE is the firm size measured by the log of the total asset; INF is the dummy variable, equal to 1 if a firm 
is from the service sector and 0 if from the industrial sector; METH is the privatization method represented by a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if strategic partnership is used and 0 if direct selling is used; MAJ is a dummy variable, equal to 1 
if government ownership is less than 50% and 0 if otherwise; YEAR is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the observation 
is after or in the privatization year and 0 if otherwise; MED is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the observation is after or 
during the privatization median year and 0 if otherwise; γ is fixed-year effects; and ε is the error term. Heteroskedasticity 
robust p-values are reported in parentheses. A constant term is included in each regression. Here, N refers to the number of 
observations. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
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an endogenous problem exists if the model is retained 
without specifying the model correctly. 
 Different results are obtained from the Hausman 
test of endogeneity after specifying the model system 
using METH in the second stage. The results show that 
the IVs are uncorrelated with the error term, which 
satisfies the E [ε1itZit] assumption. Thus, the t-statistic 
for the coefficient on the residuals from the first step 
regression is (0.514). The p-value of this test is clearly 
not significant at any level. Thus, this test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between ownership 
concentration and the error term. The finding indicates 
that the system of equations utilized in the present study 
are properly identified. Moreover, the requirement for 
good IVs is that they be correlated with the left-hand side 
(ownership concentration), which is in turn correlated 
with the error term. The present study conducts the first 
stage equation (reduce form), then uses the Wald test to 
test for joint instrument coefficients. Then, the present 
study performs the F-test for the joint insignificant of the 
IVs as follows: C(2) = 0, C(3) = 0, C(4) = 0, and C(5) 
= 0, corresponding to β1, β2, β3, and β4, respectively, in 
the reduced form,1which are the instrument coefficients 
for the SIZE, INF, YEAR, and MED, respectively. The null 
hypothesis of the F-test joint is that the coefficients of the 
IVs are 0. The alternative hypotheses are that at least one 
of the IV parameters in the reduced form is not 0, which 
is exactly what is needed. The role of the F-statistic value 
is greater than 10 [F>10]. Thus, a strong rejection at the 
1% level for CONC regression is found (F-statistic=178.27, 
p-value=0.000). This finding is consistent with that of 
Boubakri et al. (2005) where p-value=0.0001. Therefore, 
at least one of the parameters is not 0. However, the 
hypotheses that the instruments are jointly 0 for the 
performance regression (F-statistic=1.39, P-value=0.23) 
cannot be rejected when regressing “performance” on 
the instrument. Furthermore, several studies argue and 
have proven that non-linear relationships exist between 
ownership and company performance (Himmelberg et al. 
1999; McConnell & Servaes 1990; Morck et al. 1989). 
Following Boubakri et al. (2005b), CONC and its squared 
CONC2 are used to check the non-linear relationships. The 
results show that CONC (CONCit = α +β1SIZEit + β2INFit+ 
β3YEARit+ β4MEDit +γt + εit) has a positive and highly 
significant impact at the 5% level, which is consistent 
with the finding of Boubakri et al. (2005). 
 Results prove that the system of equations is properly 
identified after the system is tested by 2SLS. In addition, 
Larmou and Vafeas (2010) argue that the statistical 
positive significant point can be considered as the optimal 
point of board size. Therefore, the present study tests 
several dummy variables, which are explained in the 
methodology section, of the board size to determine the 
significant positive point of the optimal board size. D1 
in equation Eq. 3 is found to be significant at the 5% 
level, whereas D2, D3, and D4are not significant at the 
conventional level. The results obtained from Eq. 3 are 
reported in Table 5 using three measures of company 
performance: ROE, PER and PBVR. 
 The results indicate that CONC is significantly related 
to accounting performance in two specifications (Model 
1 and Model 2) at the 10% level. This finding supports 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) contention that ownership 
concentration can mitigate agency problems and improve 
privatized company performance. Conversely, diffused 
ownership may negatively affect company performance. 
Meanwhile, different results are obtained for the market 
measures of performance (PER, PBVR). The CONC coefficient 
is not significantly related to the company’s market 
performance at the conventional level. The results are 
similar to those of previous studies, such as Omran (2009) 
and Omran et al. (2008).
 Furthermore, the METH dummy coefficients are 
positively significant in nearly all models. This result 
suggests that strategic partnerships have a positive impact 
on accounting and market-based performance.
 Audit quality is also observed to have a positive and 
highly significant association with company performance 
(except in Models 2 and 3, where PER is used as performance 
indicator). The results confirm the expectation that private 
investors are more likely to employ professional audit 
firms, which will lead to better company performance. 
 The change in board members that occurs during the 
privatization process shows a positive and highly significant 
effect on the company’s accounting performance. A change 
in the composition of the board of director shows a positive 
and significant (p<10%) association with company value 
only in Model 3, which uses PER as the performance 
indicator. However, a change in the composition of the 
board of directors is not significant when PBVR is used as 
the indicator. Thus, BOCH will not be able to change the 
performance of privatized companies, particularly when 
market measure is used as the performance indicator.
 The BOZ coefficient shows a negative and significant 
association at the 1% level with company performance. 
However, after controlling for aboard size of less than 
nine members, the coefficient shows a positive and highly 
significant association at the 1% level with company 
performance. Interesting results emerge in Model 3 when 
ROE, PER, and PBVR exhibit that BOCH and BOZ of less 
than 9 have significant effects on the performance of 
companies. However, having BOCH alone has no effect 
on the performance of companies. This result indicates 
that a change in the composition of the board of directors 
(probably political directors) is a key factor in the effect 
of board composition on a company’s performance as well 
as its growth in the future.
 Different results are obtained on the effect of 
independent variables on the company performance 
proxies. The proxies are measuring accounting (ROA) and 
market (PER, PBVR) performance. Omran (2009) states 
that accounting-based measures indicate past and current 
performances. The level of company growth affects the 
market measures more than the accounting measures of 
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performance. Furthermore, Omran (2009) argues that 
market measure captures business potentials and growth 
in the future. Those substantial differences between the 
two measures explain the variation of the two results. 
Moreover, the Jordanian stock market, similar to those 
in other Arab countries, is less efficient compared with 
the capital markets of developed countries (Omran et al. 
2008). Thus, the Jordanian stock market needs to be more 
transparent and disseminate information that an outside 
investor can expect to be reflected in the company value. 
Furthermore, the descriptive analysis of ownership shows 
that the government still has control over the firms (Omran 
et al. 2008; Omran 2009). 
 The conclusion of this analysis is that CG mechanisms 
help in mitigating agency problems and contribute to 
the success of the privatization program in Jordan. CG 
mechanisms generally show positive and significant effects 
on the performance of companies. The results provide 
motivation for the present study to further investigate 
the types of ownership concentration affecting company 
performance. 
 The next section of the present study discusses the 
effects of foreign ownership concentration on company 
performance. The types of foreign ownership include 
Arab ownership; non-Arab ownership; and government 
ownership.
Ownership type  Extant studies argue that ownership type 
might have a relevant relationship with the performance 
of privatized firms (Boycko et al. 1994; Boycko et al. 
1996; Dyck 2001; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Privatization 
theory suggests that different owners have different 
incentives to monitor managers, which, in the end, 
determine company performance. 
 Studies suggest different types of CONC, such as 
individual investor, domestic institutional investors, and 
employment (Boubakri et al. 2005b; Omran 2009; Omran 
et al. 2008). Several privatization studies find that foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on the performance of 
privatized companies (Ben Naceur et al. 2007; Boubakri 
et al. 2005; Hanousek et al. 2007; Okten & Arin 2006). 
The present study presents the unique opportunity to 
examine two types of foreign ownership available in 
Jordan, which are foreign Arab ownership and non-Arab 
ownership; and government ownership. The data set 
relating to ownership according to type is depicted in 
Table 6. A multivariate regression of the same system of 
Eqs. 3 and 4 is estimated to investigate the relationship of 
these types of ownership with company performance. In 
the first stage, regression analysis is performed using the 
same instrument variables for each type of owner because, 
according to Boubakri et al. (2005), the percentage 
held by certain types of owners can be endogenously 
TABLE 5. Second-stage regression results
PERFit = α1 + β1 it + β3BOCHit+ METH+ β2AUQit + β4BOZit + (β5BOZit x Dn,it) + γt +εit …… (3) 
Dependant
 ROE PER PBVR
Independent Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CONC 0.074*
(1.885)
0.085*
(2.270)
0.071
(1.498)
-0.095
(-0.908)
-0.120
(-1.257)
-0.096
(-1.010)
-0.001
(-0.320)
-0.006
(-1.029)
-0.005
(-1.039)
BOCH 2.864**
(2.131)
2.707***
(1.989)
3.107***
(2.334)
-4.958
(-1.395)
3.599
(1.481)
4.068*
(1.732)
0.029
(0.411)
0.002
(0.026)
0.001
(0.009)
METH 1.431***
(1.915)
0.248
(0.425)
0.786
(1.178)
8.207***
(3.259)
8.093***
(3.040)
9.356***
(3.491)
0.475***
(3.263)
0.590***
(4.408)
0.590***
(4.460)
AUQ 2.866***
(2.171)
2.940***
(1.979)
3.104***
(1.938)
4.230*
(1.836)
-1.809
(-0.795)
-2.039
(-0.866)
0.286***
(2.884)
0.314***
(3.555)
0.312***
(3.437)
BOZ -0.547***
(-2.637)
-0.366*
(-1.888)
-0.071***
(-2.913)
LESS THAN 9 0.807***
(1.790)
-2.774***
(-6.592)
-0.067
(-1.929)
N 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.086 0.112 0.062 0.0579 0.071 0.243 0.273 0.267
F- statistic 2.085*** 2.041*** 2.295*** 1.797*** 1.6759* 1.783*** 5.205*** 5.501*** 5.060*** 
Note: The table shows the regression results of the 2SLS of the relationship between private ownership concentration and firm performance, where PERF is the performance 
of the firm represented by return on equity (ROE), price to book value ratio (PBVR), and price earnings ratio (PER); CONC is the private ownership concentration measured 
by the sum of the shareholdings of the three largest private shareholders; AUQ is the audit quality measured by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm appoints Big 
Four audit firms and 0 if otherwise; BOCH is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm change its board of directors and 0 if otherwise; METH is the privatization method 
measured by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if strategic partnership is used and 0 if direct selling is used; BOZ is the board size that measures the number of members of the 
board of directors; LESS THAN 9 is equal to 1 if the board members is less than 9 and 0 if otherwise; the term γ is a firm dummy introduced for firm-specific effect; and 
ε is the error term. All regressions include year fixed-effect (coefficient estimates not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust p-values are reported in parentheses. A constant 
term is included in each regression. Here, N refers to the number of observations. Figures between parentheses are t-statistics. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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determined by other factors. The results of this system 
are reported in Table 7. 
 Table 7shows that after controlling BOCH and BOZ, 
METH, and AU, foreign non-Arab ownership concentration 
has a marginally positive impact (at the 10% level) on 
the accounting performance of companies. This result 
supports the contentions of Boycko et al. (1996) and 
Dyck (2001) that foreign investors play an important 
role in bringing in a system of efficient CG mechanisms 
that can lead to higher company performance. However, 
foreign non-Arab ownership concentration does not 
show any significant effect on company performance 
based on market measures. This result is consistent 
with that of Boubakri et al. (2005b), who finds no 
significant relationship between foreign investors and 
the performance of privatized firms. In addition, Omran 
et al. (2008) find that CONC, including foreign ownership 
concentration, does not have any significant level of 
impact on firm performance in Arab countries. The reason 
is that foreign owners need more time to understand the 
environment (Cull et al. 2002).
 The results find that government ownership also 
has a positive and significant impact at the 5% level on 
company performance. However, after controlling for 
the effect of BOZ, the result becomes insignificant. This 
result is consistent with Omran et al. (2008), who find 
that government ownership has a positive and significant 
impact on company performance in Arab countries. The 
reason for this finding is the involvement of politicians in 
the board of directors of privatized companies. As stated 
in Jordanian Privatization Law 2000, Article (14), the 
government has a special voting right, referred to as the 
‘Golden Share’, which gives the government the right to 
veto the resolutions of the board of directors. 
 However, a contrasting result emerges when the 
market measure of performance is used. Government 
ownership concentration appears to have a negative 
and significant impact at the 10% level on company 
performance. Thus, government ownership concentration 
is not recommended to improve the market performance 
of privatized companies. This result can explain the role 
of the state and the political nature of Arab countries 
(Omran et al. 2008). The ‘Golden Share’ negatively 
affects the company’s growth (Boycko et al. 1996). The 
reason for this effect is the higher agency problem. The 
government can increase the soft-budget constraint, 
which results in the government providing subsidies to 
unwise investments that can lead to less constraints and 
monitoring mechanisms on managers (Kornai et al. 2003). 
 The results presented in Table 7 are consistent with 
previous findings concerning the impact of METH on 
company performance. Privatization methods show a 
positive and significant relationship at the 1% level with 
company performance. Furthermore, AU also shows a 
positive and significant effect on performance at the 1% 
level. These results support the finding of other studies, 
such as Guedhami et al. (2009) and Lin and Liu (2010), 
that foreign owners are more interested in employing 
professional audit firms in privatized companies. The 
results also suggest that the change in board members 
significantly affects the performance of privatized 
companies, whereas BOZ does not have any significant 
TABLE 6. Ownership Structure of Privatized Companies
Ownership Share Years Before Privatization Ownership Share Years After Privatization
Year -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Type owners 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
JOWNC
 Mean
 Median
obs.
43.54
41.8
180
43.54
41.8
180
43.54
41.8
180
43.71
41.54
180
40.42
34.86
180
40.5
29.87
180
39.7
37.8
180
36.06
28.86
180
35.51
28.86
180
34.02
21.82
180
CONC
 Mean
 Median
obs.
Total-%
56.46
58.2
180
%100
56.46
58.2
180
%100
56.46
58.2
180
%100
56.29
58.46
180
%100
59.58
65.14
180
%100
59.5
62.2
180
%100
60.3
62.2
180
%100
63.94
71.14
180
%100
64.49
71.14
180
%100
65.98
78.18
180
%100
FOWNC
 Mean
 Median
obs.
0.24
0.04
180
0.24
0.04
180
0.24
0.04
180
0.36
0.05
180
0.44
0.06
180
0.7
0.06
180
0.66
0.05
180
2.81
0.07
180
3.3
0.06
180
3.11
0.05
180
A-FOWNC
 Mean
 Median
obs.
7.41
1.84
180
7.41
1.84
180
7.41
1.84
180
6.98
1.68
180
6.82
1.69
180
7.65
2.6
180
7.65
2.6
180
7.63
3.05
180
7.34
2.34
180
7.31
2.46
180
Note: JOWNC is the Jordanian government ownership. CONC is the measured by the sum of the shares held by the largest three private shareholders. FOWNC is the 
foreign Non-Arabic ownership. A-FOWNC is the foreign Arabic ownership. Obs is the number of observation.  
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TABLE 7. Effects of private ownership type
PERFit = α1 + θijtCONCijt + β3BOCHit + β2AUQit + β4BOZit + (β5BOZit x Dn,it) + γt +εit…… (4)
Dependent 
ROE PER PBVR
Independent Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FOWNC 3.676 3.712* 2.588 -0.295 -2.425 0.300 -0.221 -0.070 -0.083
(1.437) (1.695) (0.998) (-0.045) (-0.419) (0.053) (-0.882) (-0.280) (-0.300)
A-FOWNC 0.115 0.090 0.017 -0.468 -0.414 -0.230 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
(1.234) (0.631) (0.128) (-1.394) (-1.310) (-0.673) (-0.578) (-0.775) (-0.835)
JOWNC 0.325** 0.242 0.213 -0.216 -0.440* -0.257 -0.012 -0.020*** -0.020***
(1.965) (0.777) (0.722) (-0.718) (-1.738) (-1.047) (-0.831) (-2.713) (-2.587)
BOCH 2.490* 2.320* 2.674*** -5.153 -3.206 -3.598 -0.011 0.025 -0.027***
(1.890) (1.876) (2.173) (-1.337) (-1.235) (-1.539) (-0.138) (0.337) (-0.356)
METH 2.311*** 1.703 2.383* 7.945*** 7.866*** 9.163*** 0.478*** 0.623*** 0.624***
(4.314) (1.281) (1.829) (2.954) (3.776) (4.355) (3.290) (4.532) (4.619)
AUQ 3.782*** 3.357*** 3.714*** -3.413 -1.573 -1.956 0.315*** 0.291*** -0.289
(3.299) (2.705) (2.899) (-1.563) (-0.765) (-0.953) (2.845) (2.912) (-2.900)
BOZ -0.320 -0.146 -0.077***
(-0.575) (-0.188) (-3.135)
LESS THAN 9 1.190*** -2.742*** -0.073
(2.707) (-5.795) (-1.848)
N 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.064 0.090 0.049 0.043 0.050 0.237 0.262 0.256
F-Statistic 1.808*** 1.655* 1.887*** 1.535 1.431 1.469 4.491*** 4.686*** 4.356*** 
Note: The table shows the regression results of the 2SLS of the relationship between private ownership concentration and firm 
performance, where PERF is the performance for the firm represented by return on equity (ROE), price to book value ratio (PBVR) and 
price earnings ratio (PER); CONC is the private ownership concentration measured by the sum of the shareholdings of the three largest 
private shareholders (i.e., its type j, which refers to the foreign ownership of non-Arab, foreign Arab, and government ownership); 
AUQ is the audit quality measured by the dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm appoints a Big Four audit firms and 0 if otherwise; 
BOCH is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm changes its board of directors and 0 if otherwise; METH is the privatization method 
measured by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if strategic partnership is used and 0 if direct selling is used; BOZ is the board size that 
measures the number of members of the board of directors, equal to LESS THAN 9 is 1 if the board members is less than 9 and 0 if 
otherwise; the term γ is a firm dummy introduced for firm specific effect; and ε is the error term. All regressions include year fixed-
effect (coefficient estimates not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust p-values are reported in parentheses. A constant term is included 
in each regression. Here, N refers to the number of observations. Figures between parentheses are t-statistics. Significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
effect on company performance after BOZ is controlled 
for in boards of directors with less than nine members. 
 The variables METH, AUQ, and BOCH have a marginally 
positive and significant impact at the 10% level on company 
market performance. In contrast, BOZ exhibits a negative 
effect on performance even after being controlled for in 
boards of directors with less than nine board members. In 
addition, this result is in line with the previous argument 
that the ‘Golden Share’ gives considerable power to the 
government.
 The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with 
previous findings concerning the impact of METH on 
company performance. Privatization methods show a 
positive and significant relationship at the 1% level with 
company performance. Furthermore, AUQ also shows a 
positive and significant effect on performance at the 1% 
level. These results support the finding of other studies, 
such as Guedhami et al. (2009) and Lin and Liu (2010), 
that foreign owners are more interested in employing 
professional audit firms in privatized companies. The 
results also suggest that the change in the composition 
of the board of directors significantly affects the 
performance of privatized companies, whereas BOZ does 
not have any significant effect on company performance 
after BOZ is controlled for in boards of directors with less 
than nine members. 
 The variables METH,  AUQ,  and BOCH have a 
marginally positive and significant impact at the 10% 
level on company market performance. In contrast, BOZ 
exhibits a negative effect on performance even after being 
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controlled for in boards of directors with less than nine 
board members. In addition, this result is in line with 
the previous argument that the ‘Golden Share’ gives 
considerable power to the government. 
 In general, the multivariate analyses suggest that 
the concentration of ownership types is important in 
explaining the performance of privatized companies. 
Consistent results are also found regarding the positive 
effect of METH and BOCH on company performance. 
CONCLUSION
The present study investigates the success of the 
privatization program in Jordan, as well as the relationship 
between CG and privatized company performance. Unique 
case data relating to the Jordanian privatization program 
under the close supervision of the royal family is examined 
in the present study. Using pooled data, the present 
study examines variables predicted to have effects on 
ownership concentration. The results show that company 
size; firm type; privatization method; and the years effect 
significantly determine ownership concentration. The 
study uses the 2SLS method to control for the endogeneity 
of company ownership. The results are in line with the 
expectations of the present study. The results from the 
system of models support the idea that privatization 
methods have a positive effect on the performance of 
privatized companies. These results show that the role of 
the royal family in monitoring the privatization process 
subsequently reduces political gain through the reduction 
in government ownership. 
 The royal family’s involvement is a good mechanism 
in mitigating agency problems in the privatization of 
SOEs. In addition, private ownership concentration has 
a positive effect on company performance. Similarly, 
audit quality and board of director change demonstrate a 
positive and significant effect on company performance. 
However, having more than nine members on the 
board is not advisable for these companies. The study 
also shows that government ownership concentration 
negatively affects company performance. At the same 
time, the concentration of foreign non-Arab ownership 
positively affects company performance. The present 
study adds some evidence concerning the factors that 
determine the success of privatization, particularly 
in developing countries in the Middle East and some 
other Asian countries, where the involvement of royal 
families in politics and business is common. An agency 
perspective alone is proven to be insufficient to explain 
the phenomena. Some political interventions, which serve 
as the background of the present study, significantly affect 
the success of privatization in Jordan.
 The implication of the results generated from the 
present study can be categorized into two perspectives: 
theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the royal family’s 
involvement, quality audit, and change in board members 
(possibly political managers) are good mechanisms in 
reducing the agency problem through political influence 
and in helping privatization programs to be successful. 
In addition, strategic partnership privatization methods 
and foreign non-Arab investors enhance the performance 
of privatized companies in the Jordanian context. Thus, 
selecting the right investors is important for privatization. 
Practically, good CG practices are needed in Jordan. 
These practices will lead to higher accountability, 
which can improve the performance of privatized 
companies. Therefore, reducing government ownership 
and intervention can help companies to improve their 
performance in the future. 
 One major limitation in the present study is the 
sample time period. A more recent data set is unavailable. 
Thus, whether or not the results will hold under the current 
market and economic conditions cannot be ascertained. 
More CG mechanisms and macroeconomic reform 
information are needed in the models to investigate 
the effects more deeply. Further research is needed to 
investigate the specific characteristics of the strategic 
partners chosen by the royal family to determine how 
these characteristics affect the performance of privatized 
companies. 
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TABLE 9. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Descriptive Statistics-Privatized
PBVR PER ROE BOZ  Log( SIZE)
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Obs.
0.22
5.54
1.61
0.89
1.44
2.84
175
0.27
157
19.63
18.69
3.47
19.14
161
0.46
83.7
12.68
9.85
2.78
15.92
162
6
15
10.37
1.96
0.26
0.1
179
16.05
17.99
16.88
0.58
0.39
1.68
178
Note: PBVR is the price to book value ratio;PER is the price earnings ratio; ROE is the return on equity;BOZ is the board size; andLog(SIZE) 
is the log of total assets of the firms. 
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APPENDIX A
OLS Estimation of The instrument with the other variables on company performance
Dependant
PBVR
Independent Coefficient T-statistic
AUQ -0.938328 (-0.515158)
BOCH 2.604040  (0.808102)
BOZ 0.033993 (0.048443)
INF -2.624573 (-0.843356)
MAJ 2.168422 (0.898564)
METH 7.049688*** (3.602573)
MED -5.802942 (-1.622008)
YEAR -7.658776 (-1.207053)
SIZE -0.369199 (-0.363018(
C 35.05496*** (2.577649)
N 160 160
Adjusted R2 0.037256 0.037256 
Note: This table reports regression analysis of the instrument with the other variables on company performance. AUQ refers 
to the audit quality; BOCH refers to the change in the board of directors; BOZ refers to the total number of the board of 
directors; INF refers to the company type; MAJ refers to whether the government owned less than 50% or more than 50% of 
ownership; METH refers to the privatization methods; MED refers to the whether the companies privatized after the median 
year of privatization or not; YEAR refers to privatization years; and SIZE is refers to the total assets of the companies. *, ** 
and *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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